CLS Working Papers, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus
Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?
() and Birthe Larsen
Abstract: This paper challenges the traditional view that
unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The
insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they
search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience
relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a
monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority
voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the
possibility of lower unemployment when insiders are decisive in the union
than if outsiders were decisive in the union.
Keywords: Insiders and outsiders; Search; Uemployment; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: J64; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, March 1, 2000
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helle Vinbaek Stenholt ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom