Working Papers, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus
Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model
Abstract: This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining
situation. We show
that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a
conflict-free outcome, are viable
if players have enough information
about opponents’ preferences. However, depending
on the initial
starting point, preference evolution can in general both
reduce subjective and material welfare, relative to the situation where
all players have the usual materialistic preferences.
Keywords: Preference evolution; Reciprocity; Altruism; Materialism; Subjective and material eciency; Bargaining; Indirect evolutionary approach; (follow links to similar papers)
18 pages, March 19, 2001
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