Working Papers, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus
On Efficiency, Tie Breaking Rules and Role Assignment Procedures in Evolutionary Bargaining
Abstract: We study a simple evolutionary bargaining game and show
that the efficiency of bargaining behavior can depend crucially on the tie
breaking rule players use. In fact, in a certain limit all the surplus is
wasted. Inefficiency arises for any role assignment procedure, as long as
there is some probability that two players are assigned to the same role.
We also give results on the relationship between inefficiency and
Keywords: Game theory Bargaining; Two-stage Nash Demand Game; Efficiency; Evolutionary stability; Tie-breaking role assignment; Truly asymmetric contest; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; (follow links to similar papers)
9 pages, November 1, 2003
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