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Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus Working Papers, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus

No 03-9:
On Efficiency, Tie Breaking Rules and Role Assignment Procedures in Evolutionary Bargaining

Anders Poulsen ()

Abstract: We study a simple evolutionary bargaining game and show that the efficiency of bargaining behavior can depend crucially on the tie breaking rule players use. In fact, in a certain limit all the surplus is wasted. Inefficiency arises for any role assignment procedure, as long as there is some probability that two players are assigned to the same role. We also give results on the relationship between inefficiency and spitefulness.

Keywords: Game theory Bargaining; Two-stage Nash Demand Game; Efficiency; Evolutionary stability; Tie-breaking role assignment; Truly asymmetric contest; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C70; (follow links to similar papers)

9 pages, November 1, 2003

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