Working Papers, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus
Elke J. Jahn
Job Security as an Endogenous Job Characteristic
() and Thomas Wagner
Abstract: This paper develops a hedonic model of job security (JS).
Workers with heterogeneous JS-preferences pay the hedonic price for JS to
employers, who incur labor-hoarding costs from supplying JS. In contrast to
the Wage-Bill Argument, equilibrium unemployment is strictly positive, as
workers with weak JS-preferences trade JS for higher wages. The relation
between optimal job insecurity and the perceived dismissal probability is
hump-shaped. If firms observe demand, but workers do not, separation is not
contractible and firms dismiss workers at-will. Although the workers are
risk-averse, they respond to the one-sided private information by trading
wage-risk for a higher JS. With two-sided private information, even
JS-neutral workers pay the price for a JS guarantee, if their risk premium
associated with the wage-replacement risk is larger than the social net
loss from production.
Keywords: job security; hedonic market; implicit contract theory; guaranteed employment contract; severance pay contract; asymmetric information; prudence; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D86; J41; J65; K31; (follow links to similar papers)
50 pages, April 1, 2008
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