S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers, Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland

No 7/2005:
Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia

Sophie Claeys ()

Abstract: The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not raditional to a central bank. In addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector. It is currently overssing the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and is the main owner of Russia's largest commercial bank, Sberbank. As this additional functions may conflict with the CBR policy objectives, I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank prescribed in the literature. I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory body within the CBR. Using a simple Taylor rule framework I find that the CBR does not use its "hands-on" supervisory information to maintain financial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned banks' balances.

Keywords: Central Bank; Prudential Regulation and Supervision; Monetary Policy Rules; Russia; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: G21; G28; (follow links to similar papers)

41 pages, July 8, 2005

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

dp0705.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Päivi Määttä ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2005_007 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 19:21:16