BOFIT Discussion Papers, Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland
No 10/2005:
Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives
Sophie Claeys, Gleb Lanine and Koen Schoors ()
Abstract: We focus on the conflict between two central bank
objectives – individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the
licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999-2002.
Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined
adequately, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy
protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for
systemic stability. The CBR is also found reluctant to with-draw licenses
from banks that violate the individual's deposits-to-capital ratio as this
conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and
systemic stability.
Keywords: bank supervision; bank crisis; Russia; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: E50; G20; N20; (follow links to similar papers)
63 pages, September 5, 2005
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