Research Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland
No 12/2012:
Are firm- and country-specific governance substitutes? Evidence from financial contracts in emerging markets
Bill Francis ()
, Iftekhar Hasan ()
and Liang Song ()
Abstract: We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance
influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this
relation varies across countries with different country-level governance.
We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable
contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral
requirements, and spread. Firm-level and country-level corporate governance
are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. We also find
that the distinctiveness of borrowers’ characteristics affect the relation
between firm-level corporate governance and loan contracting terms. Our
findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and
specifications.
Keywords: corporate governance; financial contracts; emerging markets; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: G20; G30; G31; G34; G38; (follow links to similar papers)
57 pages, April 12, 2012
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
copyright.
Download GhostScript
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
BoF_DP_1212.pdf 
Download Statistics
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Minna Nyman ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom
