Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School Working Paper Series, Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School

No 1999-10:
CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange

Robert Neumann and Torben Voetmann

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between performance and CEO turnovers using

a sample of 81 turnovers and 81 matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock

Exchange. We find that poor performance increases the probability of management

replacements and that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary

resignations are value-decreasing events. Institutional investors as active monitors, or

part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the analysis of CEO turnovers. If

institutional investors have any influence on CEO turnovers, then it is not revealed in

our data. But, the results suggest that institutional investors' equity holdings tend to

protect managers from replacement.

Keywords: CEO Turnovers; Corporate Governance; Ownership Structure; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: G14; G23; G32; (follow links to similar papers)

34 pages, May 17, 2001

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

8790705254.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:1999_010 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 19:21:43