Working Paper Series, Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School
Henrik Lando and Caspar Rose
On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs
Abstract: Abstract: We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the
on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of
remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance
is almost never
claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a
party in breach to
perform actions while damages involves extracting
only a monetary
payment. The former is more difficult and more
coercive. We study
enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany.
specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in
Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of
enforcement to the claimant.
Keywords: Law; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: A00; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, May 1, 2001
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