S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School

No 01-2002:
Lobbying and Legislative Organization The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Morten Bennedsen and Sven E. Feldmann

Abstract: We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects

interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision

of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that

the effectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions.We show

in a multi-period policy framework that a distinguishing feature between the US

Congress and European parliamentary systems —the vote of confidence procedure —

can significantly change the incentives for interest group lobbying.

Keywords: Organizational form; legislative institutions; Lobbying; Parliamentary systems; Politics; Interest groups; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: A10; E10; E60; H00; (follow links to similar papers)

26 pages, January 1, 2002

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

7616    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_001 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 19:21:48