Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School
Mixed R&D incentives: the effect of R&D subsidies on patented inventions
Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of mixed public-private
R&D incentives and empirically tests whether patents that were publicly
sponsored are more important than non-subsidized ones. Blending patents and
public subsidies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inventions that
would otherwise not elicit investment because the private incentive will
not fully cover the cost of the invention. Thus, the policy maker will only
subsidize inventions that have a high social value. The empirical analysis
shows that subsidized inventions result in more important patents, as
measured by the number of forward citations.
Keywords: na; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: G10; (follow links to similar papers)
21 pages, January 1, 2008
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom