Working papers in Transport Economics
Race to the top in traffic calming
() and Jonas Westin
Abstract: We study the competition of two suburbs that are facing
transit traffic flows. We show that in the absence of toll measures, the
Nash equilibrium leads to a race to the top in traffic calming, except for
the measures that do not affect the generalized cost of traffic. The Nash
equilibrium is compared to two types of centralized decisions: the
symmetric solution and the asymmetric solution. It is shown how the
asymmetric solution that concentrates all transit traffic in one suburb is
better but can only be realized if the authority over the local roads is
transferred to the central authority.
Keywords: Transport; Externalities; Traffic calming; Multi-level government; Regulation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H23; H77; Q58; R41; R48; (follow links to similar papers)
26 pages, December 2, 2014
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