Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI)
CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI)
Working papers in Transport Economics

No 2016:20:
Contract design and performance of railway maintenance: effects of incentive intensity and performance incentive schemes

Kristofer Odolinski ()

Abstract: In this paper we study the effect of contract design on the performance of railway maintenance in Sweden, using a panel data set over the period 2003-2013. The marginal effect of incentive intensity is estimated, showing that the power of incentive schemes improve performance as measured by the number of infrastructure failures. In addition, the performance incentive schemes result in a reallocation of effort from failures not causing train delays to failures causing train delays

Keywords: Contract design; Incentive intensity; Maintenance; Railways; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D82; L92; (follow links to similar papers)

39 pages, September 28, 2016

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

CTS2016-20.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Mats Berggren ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2016_020 This page was generated on 2016-09-28 14:21:32