Working Paper Series, FIEF - Trade Union Institute for Economic Research
Mahmood Arai and Peter Skogman Thoursie
Incentives and Selection in Cyclical Absenteeism
Abstract: Procyclical absenteeism might be due to higher sick-rates
of marginal workers, or a consequence of procyclical sick-report
incentives. These hypotheses predict opposite signs for the correlation
between sick-rates and shares of temporary contracts. This is the case,
when the share of temporary contracts is a proxy for the share of marginal
workers, and an indicator of stronger incentives for job presence of
temporary employees who have generally weaker job security than those on
permanent contracts. Using industry-region panel data, we find a stable
negative correlation between sick-rates and shares of temporary contracts
implying that procyclical sick-rate is compatible with the idea that
sick-report incentives are procyclical.
Keywords: Absenteeism; Temporary Employment; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: J22; (follow links to similar papers)
16 pages, March 5, 2001
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Arai, Mahmood and Peter Skogman Thoursie, 'Incentives and Selection in Cyclical Absenteeism', Labour Economics.
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