Göteborg Papers in Economic History
A decisive intelligence failure? British intelligence on Soviet war potential and the 1939 Anglo-French-Soviet alliance that never was
Abstract: In 1939 the British Government tried to assess Soviet war
potential in order to know more about their potential ally, as part of the
negotiations concerning an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. British
assessments of Soviet economic and military strength (and the internal
stability of the Stalin regime) in this context have partly been neglected
in earlier research, and it seems both that British estimates were much
more off the mark than earlier supposed, and that the gross underestimation
of Soviet strength in 1939 was probably a major factor in the British
reluctance to enter into an anti-Hitler coalition with the USSR.
Keywords: Economic History; Soviet Union; British Intelligence; Soviet war potential; Second World War; Soviet economy; Soviet military strength; Appeasement policy; Intelligence failures; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: B20; F51; F52; N00; N40; N44; P20; P29; P52; Z00; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, March 7, 2008
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