Working Papers in Economics
A Microeconomic Analysis of Institutions
Abstract: This survey paper has three themes; a microeconomic
analysis of institutions, an institutional analysis of microeconomics, and
a discussion on the scope for an "institutional microeconomics" that takes
insights from psychology and older institutional theory into account.
Institutions are defined as the long-run rules of the economy that have the
character of public goods and whose main function is the reduction of
transaction costs. The institutional requirements for the Walrasian
equilibrium and for a cooperative solution in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like
game, are thoroughly analyzed. The paper briefly surveys the main results
from the OIE and NIE-schools and discusses the possibilities of an
interdisciplinarily oriented institutional microeconomics.
Keywords: institutions; microeconomics; Walrasian equilibrium; game theory; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D23; D70; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, June 8, 2000
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