Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
No 166: Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh
Olof Johansson-Stenman (), Minhaj Mahmud () and Peter Martinsson ()
Additional contact information
Olof Johansson-Stenman: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
Minhaj Mahmud: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
Peter Martinsson: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either within or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents’ behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people’s behaviour.
Keywords: Trust; trust game; social capital; field experiment; Bangladesh
35 pages, March 31, 2005
Note: Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
- Published as
- Olof Johansson-Stenman, Minhaj Mahmud and Peter Martinsson, (2013), 'Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol 95, pages 286-298
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