Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
No 439: Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment
Martin G. Kocker, Marc V. Lenz and Matthias Sutter ()
Additional contact information
Martin G. Kocker: University of Munich and University of Innsbruck
Marc V. Lenz: University of Cologne
Matthias Sutter: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.
Keywords: Tournament; first-mover advantage; psychological pressure; field experiment; soccer; penalty shootouts
JEL-codes: C93
12 pages, March 31, 2010
Full text files
22201 HTML file
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2024-02-05 17:11:22.