S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
China Economic Research Center, Stockholm School of Economics China Economic Research Center Working Paper Series

No 2012-23:
Citizenry Accountability in Autocracies: The Political Economy of Good Governance in China

Mario Gilli () and Yuan Li ()

Abstract: Do citizens have a role in constraining the policies of autocratic governments? Usually political and economic literature models autocracy as if citizens have no role in constraining a leader's behavior, when in fact autocratic governments are afraid of potential citizen revolts. In this paper we build a three player political agency model to study citizenry accountability in autocracies. We show that the citizens can effectively discipline the leader due to the threat of revolution notwithstanding the size of the selectorate, though this may result in a failed state when the costs of revolution and the size of the selectorate are small. Our model and results provide a useful framework for interpreting the political logic of the China's economic reform after the "Tiananmen incident".

Keywords: Autocracy; Accountability; Revolt; Chinese Economic Reform; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D02; D74; H11; P30; (follow links to similar papers)

39 pages, September 20, 2012

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

hacerc2012-023.pdf    PDF-file (360kB) 
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Malin Nilsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:hacerc:2012-023 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 19:22:43