Working Papers, Hanken School of Economics
Do Analysts Leak Information to Preferred Customers?
() and Alexander von Nandelstadh
Abstract: Inspired by the recent debate in the financial press, we
set out to investigate if financial analysts warn their preferred customers
of possible earnings forecast revisions. The issue is explored by
monitoring investors’ trading behavior during the weeks prior to analyst
earnings forecast revisions, using the unique official stock transactions
data set from Finland. In summary, we do not find evidence of large
investors systematically being warned of earnings forecast revisions.
However, the results indicate that the very largest investors show trading
behavior partly consistent with being informed of future earnings forecast
Keywords: Financial analyst; information leakage; investor size; (follow links to similar papers)
33 pages, June 11, 2004
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