SITE Working Paper Series
Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
(), Werner GŁth
() and Topi Miettinen
Abstract: Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated
by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where
procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design
procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same
information on other's intentions while they have different
outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to
exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of
their moral judgment.
Keywords: procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C78; D63; Z13; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, August 13, 2009, Revised October 21, 2014
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