S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 76:
Social Relations in the Workplace: a "Linked Games" Approach

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Abstract: The paper analyses how cooperation in a repeated social game may help to sustain cooperation in a "linked" repeated production game. We show that this may happen a)because of available "social capital", defined as the slack of punishment power present in the social repeated game, b) because, when agents' utility function is strictly concave in the outcome of the two games, a simultaneous punishment in the linked games turns out to be a stronger threat than the sum of the independent punishments in the two component games, and c) because the linkage between two repeated games may generate transfers of "trust".

Keywords: Social capital; social relations; employment relation; peer pressure; work norms; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C73; D23; D73; M12; (follow links to similar papers)

31 pages, October 1995

Download Statistics


This paper is published as:
Spagnolo, Giancarlo, (1999), 'Social Relations in the Workplace: a "Linked Games" Approach', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 38, January, No. 1, pages 1-25



Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0076 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 19:22:49