SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Rationality, Transparency, and Evolutionary Selection
Abstract: We discuss attempts to justify conditional cooperation in
the Prisoners’ Dilemma based on the idea of identifying an opponent’s
strategy. We note that the concept of such complete transparency of
decision procedures is logically inconsistent. Furthermore, we observe that
attempts to justify indirect transparency on evolutionary grounds, by the
development of physical characteristics that signal behavior, must fail.
Finally, we suggest a model of partial transparency that is logically
consistent and generates conditional cooperation.
Keywords: Rationality; evolution; cooperation; transparency; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; (follow links to similar papers)
13 pages, April 1997
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom