Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 248:
Delegation of Bargaining and Power

Björn Segendorff

Abstract: Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under autarchy.

Keywords: Strategic delegation; bargaining; disagreement; power.; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C71; C72; (follow links to similar papers)

20 pages, August 31, 1998

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

hastef0248.pdf.zip    PDF-file (zipped) (422kB) 
hastef0248.pdf    PDF-file (963kB) 
hastef0248.ps.zip    PKZipped PostScript (669kB) 
hastef0248.ps    PostScript file (3.26MB) 
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0248 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 19:22:55