SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 273:
Auctioned and Re-Auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden
Mats A. Bergman ()
and Sofia Lundberg ()
Abstract: During the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children
were boarded out. The foster-parents' compensation was determined in
English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data
from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly
adverse selection affected the outcome in the market for re-auctioned
children. The empirical findings are consistent with adverse selection.
Keywords: Adverse selection; asymmetric information; common value; English auction; private values.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D44; N33; (follow links to similar papers)
32 pages, October 22, 1998
Download Statistics
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Björn Thodenius ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Björn Thodenius ().
Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom
