SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 281:
Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
Maria Saez-Marti and Jörgen W. Weibull ()
Abstract: In the models of Young (1993a, b), boundedly rational
individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic
best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an
advantage to instead play a myiopic best reply to the myopic best reply,
something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We
investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b) bargaining
model. It turns out that "cleverness" in this respect indeed does have an
advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed
about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution
remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.
Keywords: Bargaining; evolution; game theory; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; C78; (follow links to similar papers)
11 pages, November 10, 1998
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, Vol 86, No 2.
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Saez-Marti, Maria and Jörgen W. Weibull, (1999), 'Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model', Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 86, pages 268-279
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