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The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 316:
Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

Kai A. Konrad, Wolfgang Peters and Karl Wärneryd ()

Abstract: In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.

Keywords: First-price all-pay auctions; contests; strategic delegation; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D44; (follow links to similar papers)

12 pages, April 22, 1999

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