SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Kai A. Konrad, Wolfgang Peters and Karl Wärneryd
Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions
Abstract: In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive
to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with
incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to
make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative
delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if
the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.
Keywords: First-price all-pay auctions; contests; strategic delegation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D44; (follow links to similar papers)
12 pages, April 22, 1999
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom