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The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 340:
Monitoring and Pay: General results

Magnus Allgulin

Abstract: This paper considers the opitmal incentives for motivating a risk neutral, wealth constrained agent. In particular, monitoring and pay are shown to be complementary instruments under very general conditions, extending earlier results by Allgulin and Ellingsen (1998). The paper also proves that linear incentive schemes are strictly sub-optimal in this setting.

Keywords: Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: J31; J41; (follow links to similar papers)

15 pages, October 1999

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