Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 344:
Inside vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm

Holger M. Müller and Karl Wärneryd ()

Abstract: If contracting within the firm is incomplete, managers will expend resources on trying to appropriate a share of the surplus that is generated. We show that outside ownership may alleviate the deadweight losses associated with such costly distributional conflict, even if all it does is add another level of conflict. In case managers have to be provided with incentives to make firm-specific investments, there is a tradeoff between minimizing rent-seeking costs and maximizing output. This suggests, among other things, an explanation of why some firms are organized as partnerships and others as stock corporations.

Keywords: Outside ownership; rent-seeking; conflict; property rights; theory of the firm.; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D23; D74; G32; G34; L22; (follow links to similar papers)

18 pages, November 11, 1999

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This paper is published as:
Müller, Holger M. and Karl Wärneryd, (2001), 'Inside vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm', RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, pages 527-541

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