SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Price-Wars in Finite Sequential Move Price Competition: The Role of Discounting
Abstract: This paper characterizes the unique Markov equilibrium in
the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting.
Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount
factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and
below 0.75488, two-period cycles. The equilibrium path in the latter case
has continued marginal undercutting at high prices, followed by infrequent
but regular price wars. In a price war, a firm lowers all the way to a
trigger level low enough to induce the rival's raise in the price next
period. While the price war is costly, both firms benefit in form of a
higher market price in the following periods. Average long-run industry
profits are bounded below by half the monopoly level, and are non-monotonic
in the discount factor.
Keywords: Price wars; finite games; discounting; sequential moves; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; D43; L13; (follow links to similar papers)
21 pages, April 11, 2000
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