SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 388:
Information in Conflicts
Karl Wärneryd ()
Abstract: We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but
uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if
one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either
both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the
uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is
the informed agent.
Keywords: Conflict; contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D44; D72; D82; (follow links to similar papers)
17 pages, June 19, 2000
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- This paper is published as:
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Wärneryd, Karl, (2003), 'Information in Conflicts', Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 110, pages 121-136
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