Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 388:
Information in Conflicts

Karl Wärneryd ()

Abstract: We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent.

Keywords: Conflict; contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction.; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; D44; D72; D82; (follow links to similar papers)

17 pages, June 19, 2000

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This paper is published as:
Wärneryd, Karl, (2003), 'Information in Conflicts', Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 110, pages 121-136

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