SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 403:
Clever agents in adaptive learning
Alexander Matros
Abstract: Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of
letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in
Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of
players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games.
We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with
clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of
clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the
long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share
of clever agents.
Keywords: Evolution; game theory; bounded rationality; Markov chain; stochastic stability; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, October 3, 2000
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