SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 428:
Cooperation or Conflict in Common Pools
Ingela Ternström ()
Abstract: Many of the world's common pool resources are located in
poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely
affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility
function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using
non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have
lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than
groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only
moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group,
if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of
low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of
cooperation in common pool resources.
Keywords: Common pool resource; developing countries; dynamic game; irrigation; natural resource; non-linear utility; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; O13; Q15; Q25; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, January 25, 2001, Revised February 16, 2001
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