SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 458:
Credit Claiming
Amihai Glazer and Björn Segendorff
Abstract: We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who
engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s
performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the
leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for
the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the
leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the
conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low
ability.
Keywords: Leader; Credit claiming; asymmetric information; Equilibrium; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D72; D82; J33; (follow links to similar papers)
15 pages, August 14, 2001
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