SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Preparation and toolkit learning
Abstract: A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is
short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any
consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of
his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of
strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of
minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria,
minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for
the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle
down in minimal prep sets.
Keywords: noncooperative games; inertia; status quo bias; adaptive play; procedural rationality; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D83; (follow links to similar papers)
26 pages, January 4, 2002
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