SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 528:
Downsian competition in the absence of a Condorcet winner
Jesper Roine ()
Abstract: This paper studies studies two-party electoral competition
in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties
take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other's choises, altering
one's platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never
accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to
changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period
with the parties converging on whatever platform the incumbent chooses. If,
however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does
best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggest that local
equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting
process is not myopic in any way.
Keywords: Voting; Downsian competition; Local equilibrium; Spatial trembles; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D72; (follow links to similar papers)
17 pages, May 27, 2003
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