SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 529:
Voting over tax schedules in the presence of tax avoidance
Jesper Roine ()
Abstract: This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority
voting over tax schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this
setting preferences over tax schedules are not determined by earned income,
but rather by taxable income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor
supply and tax avoidance investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable
income are shown to be the same if the tax avoidance function is log
concave.
Keywords: Tax avoidance; Majority voting; Order-restricted preferences; Single-crossing condition; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C62; D70; H20; (follow links to similar papers)
12 pages, May 27, 2003
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
copyright.
Download GhostScript
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
hastef0529.pdf 
(186kB)
Download Statistics
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom
