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The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 589:
An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Mark Voorneveld (), Willemien Kets and Henk Norde

Abstract: Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.

Keywords: Minimal curb sets; Consistency; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; (follow links to similar papers)

11 pages, March 4, 2005, Revised March 23, 2005

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This paper is forthcoming as:
Voorneveld, Mark, Willemien Kets and Henk Norde, 'An axiomatization of minimal curb sets', International Journal of Game Theory.



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