SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 627:
Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants
Milo Bianchi ()
Abstract: We explore the implications of migrants' self-selection
for the determination of immigration policy in a simple model where
incentives and resources to migrate vary with skills. We show how
self-selection determines the response of potential migrants to immigration
policy changes, which is crucial for predicting the effects of such policy
in the receiving country. For example, restricting immigration when it is
low skilled may worsen self-selection and thus the receiving country skill
distribution. These selection effects may lead low skilled natives to
support a more restrictive policy even though current immigrants are not
harmful for them, and the receiving country government to impose
significant restrictions even in a purely utilitarian world.
Keywords: Immigrant self-selection; immigration policy preferences; political economy of immigration.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D78; F22; J61; O24; (follow links to similar papers)
39 pages, May 6, 2006, Revised November 2, 2006
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