SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
Abstract: In (Viossat, 2006, "The replicator dynamics does not lead
to correlated equilibria", forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it
was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies
used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take
part in any correlated equilibrium remain. Here, we generalize this result
by showing that it holds for an open set of games, and for many other
dynamics, including the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying
some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the
best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated
equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as
new pure strategies.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; survival; as-if rationality; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)
34 pages, May 15, 2006, Revised June 21, 2006
The first version was called "Evolutionary dynamics do no lead to correlated equilibria"
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