SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 641:
The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games
Yannick Viossat ()
Abstract: A pure strategy is coherent if it is played with positive
probability in at least one correlated equilibrium. A game is pre-tight if
in every correlated equilibrium, all incentives constraints for non
deviating to a coherent strategy are tight. We show that there exists a
Nash equilibrium in the relative interior of the correlated equilibrium
polytope if and only if the game is pre-tight. Furthermore, the class of
pre-tight games is shown to include and generalize the class of two-player
zero-sum games.
Keywords: correlated equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; zero-sum games; dual reduction; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; (follow links to similar papers)
32 pages, August 29, 2006
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