SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Abstract: Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free?
Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage
insurance on dental care utilization using different identification
strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an
experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as
agents act on private and generally unobservable information. By utilizing
a quasi-experimental feature of the insurance scheme the moral hazard
effect is identified on observables, and by having access to an instrument
the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using both
difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Moral Hazard; Health Insurance; Porpensity Score Matching; IV; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D82; G22; I11; (follow links to similar papers)
51 pages, November 28, 2006
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