SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
Rent Seeking and Organizational Structure
Abstract: A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be
associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat
contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain
the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly
have outside owners.
Keywords: rent seeking; contests; hierarchy; ownership of firms; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D23; D74; G32; G34; L22; (follow links to similar papers)
16 pages, June 2, 2014
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