HUI Working Papers, HUI Research
Does Physicians' Compensation Affect the Probability of their Vetoing Generic Substitution?
Abstract: Physicians' decisions whether or not to veto generic
substitution were analyzed using a sample of 350,000 pharmaceutical
prescriptions. Point estimates show that - compared to county-empoyed
physicians on salary - physicians working at private practices were 50-80%
more likely to veto substitution. The results indicate that this difference
is explained by the difference in direct cost associated with substitution,
rather than by private physicians' possibly stronger incentives to please
their patients. Also, the probability of a veto was found to increase as
patients' copayments decreased. This might indicate moral hazard in
insurance, though other exaplanations are plausible.
Keywords: doctors; salary; fee for service; moral hazard; prescriptions; drugs; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D86; I11; L33; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, April 4, 2008
- This paper is published as:
Granlund, David, (2009), 'Are private physicians more likely to veto generic substitution of prescribed pharmaceuticals?', Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 69, December, No. 11, pages 1643-1650
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