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No 14:
Does Physicians' Compensation Affect the Probability of their Vetoing Generic Substitution?

David Granlund ()

Abstract: Physicians' decisions whether or not to veto generic substitution were analyzed using a sample of 350,000 pharmaceutical prescriptions. Point estimates show that - compared to county-empoyed physicians on salary - physicians working at private practices were 50-80% more likely to veto substitution. The results indicate that this difference is explained by the difference in direct cost associated with substitution, rather than by private physicians' possibly stronger incentives to please their patients. Also, the probability of a veto was found to increase as patients' copayments decreased. This might indicate moral hazard in insurance, though other exaplanations are plausible.

Keywords: doctors; salary; fee for service; moral hazard; prescriptions; drugs; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D86; I11; L33; (follow links to similar papers)

23 pages, April 4, 2008

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This paper is published as:
Granlund, David, (2009), 'Are private physicians more likely to veto generic substitution of prescribed pharmaceuticals?', Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 69, December, No. 11, pages 1643-1650



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