HUI Working Papers, HUI Research
Public Provision and Cross-Border Health Care
() and Magnus Wikström
Abstract: We study how the optimal public provision of health care
depends on whether or not individuals have an option to seek publicly
financed treatment in other regions. We find that, relative to the
first-best solution, the government has an incentive to over-provide health
care to low-income individuals. When cross-border health care takes place,
this incentive is solely explained by that over-provision facilitates
redistribution. The reason why more health care facilitates redistribution
is that high-ability individuals mimicking low-ability individuals benefit
the least from health care when health and labor supply are complements.
Without cross-border health care, higher demand for health care among
high-income individuals also contributes to the over-provision given that
high-income individuals do not work considerably less than low-income
individuals and that the government cannot discriminate between the income
groups by giving them different access to health care.
Keywords: health expenditure; income redistribution; patient mobility; public provision; waiting time.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H42; H51; I11; I18; (follow links to similar papers)
22 pages, October 11, 2013
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
BinaryLoader.axd?OwnerID= ... Iwp98.pdf&Attachment=True
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Nilsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom