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IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy Working Paper Series
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

No 2003:5:
Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research

Peter Fredriksson () and Bertil Holmlund ()

Abstract: This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; search; monitoring; sanctions; workfare; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: J64; J65; J68; (follow links to similar papers)

38 pages, February 11, 2003

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This paper is published as:
Fredriksson, Peter and Bertil Holmlund, (2006), 'Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research', Journal of Economic Surveys, pages 375-386



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