Working Paper Series
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy
No 2007:16:
Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation
Patrik Hesselius ()
and Malin Persson ()
Abstract: In 1998 the Swedish national sickness insurance policy
changed to allow additional compensation from e.g. collective agreements
after the 90th day of absence without a reduction of the public sickness
benefit. We estimate the effects of this policy change on the duration of
sickness absence for employees in the municipal sector. After the change in
policy, this group received 10 percentage points additional compensation
during day 91 to 360 in a sick leave. The results indicate that durations
of at least 91 days increased by 4.7 days on average. As a consequence, the
cost for the national sickness insurance increased by 3.0 percent. For the
supplementary insurance to cover its total cost, insurance premiums should
be increased by 22 percent.
Keywords: Social insurance; sickness absence; collective agreements; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H51; H55; I38; J22; (follow links to similar papers)
26 pages, June 19, 2007
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