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Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University Seminar Papers, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University

No 665:
Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance

John Hassler (), José Mora (), Kjetil Storesletten () and Fabrizio Zilibotti ()

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a positive theory of unemployement insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital accross agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels into a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism which may generate multiple steady-state equilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the US and Europe respectively.

Keywords: Comparative Advatage; Employment; Political Equilibrium; Search; Specialization; Unemployment Insurance; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D72; E21; E24; J21; J24; J31; J64; J65; (follow links to similar papers)

55 pages, January 28, 1999

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