Seminar Papers, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University
No 741:
The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime
Mats Persson ()
and Claes-Henric Siven ()
Abstract: Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in
models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in Becker’s
(1968) model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal
procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and
historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and
sometimes quite low. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model
of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We
show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial
procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical
observations.
Keywords: Criminal law; Judicial error; Burden of proof; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: K40; (follow links to similar papers)
36 pages, January 1, 2006
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