Working Paper Series
David Sundén and Jörgen W. Weibull
A Note on Social Norms and Transfers
Abstract: This note elaborates an extension of the paper "Social
Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting" by Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull .
That paper studies the effects of a social norm against living off others
work. In the welfare-state context of their model, this means that
individuals who live on public transfers experience disutility. One
limitation in the model is that the individual's choice is binary: either
to work full time or not at all. Here we allow individuals to choose
working hours on a continuous scale. We derive a fixed-point equation that
determines all individuals number of work hours, and show that the
limitation to a binary choice is not binding if individuals have
Cobb-Douglas preferences and no non-labor incomes.
Keywords: Sociology; Labour Market; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: A14; (follow links to similar papers)
7 pages, May 1997
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